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This thesis aims to examine the determinants of regional proliferation in Indonesia and fiscal 
decentralization in developing countries. Additionally, it explains the mediating effect of 
institutional quality on the relationship between fiscal decentralization, growth, and inequality 
in developing countries. 
In general, my thesis is divided into three parts. The first part contains the analysis of the 
drivers of regional proliferation (known as pemekaran) as a consequence of the 
implementation of decentralization in Indonesia. Here, a qualitative analysis of the motivation 
behind pemekaran in Indonesia is expected to complement the econometric results at cross- 
province level. Upon observation of the years between 2007 and 2014, I have found that 
institutional-quality indicators, proxied by the level of administrative approvals and social 
capital, are positively and significantly correlated with the number of regional-proliferation 
events. I have also discovered that intergovernmental fiscal transfers and income per capita 
cannot be a motive for regions in Indonesia to proliferate. In addition, there is a significant 
and positive association between ethnic fractionalization and the occurrence of regional 
proliferation in Indonesia. Meanwhile, the qualitative findings in West Java and Banten show 
that territorial coalitions do matter and that there are political, economic, and bureaucratic 
rent-seeking motives behind pemekaran. 
While the first part focuses on several metrics of fiscal decentralization at the national 
level, the successive parts stress the macro dimension of the revenue and expenditure share, 
and the fiscal authority of sub-national governments at cross-country level. Drawing from the 
Government Financial Statistics (GFS) dataset and the Regional Authority Index (RAI), the 
second part explains the determinants of fiscal decentralization in developing countries. I 
argue that the different institutional settings of fiscal decentralization observed in developing 
countries depend on the quality of institutions. Specifically, policy-makers may have other 
incentives (e.g. political resistance and challenges) to alter the degrees of fiscal powers. My 
observation is based on a five-year average of periods between 1990 and 2014 in 56 
developing countries. The findings show strong evidence of a nonlinear relationship between 
institutional quality and some metrics of fiscal decentralization. In this context, as democracy 
(polity), law and order, as well as fiscal decentralization are all evolving from low levels of 
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development, a further surge in the magnitude of these institutional quality variables will 
further abate the degrees of fiscal autonomy and expenditure decentralization, respectively. 
Based on the results from the second part, the third part will discuss how fiscal 
decentralization affects growth and inequality in developing countries. In the former case (i.e. 
growth equation), based on observations in 46 developing countries from 1990 to 2014, 
findings show that growth depends on the level of fiscal authority and its interaction with 
institutions. Decentralization of revenue leads to higher economic growth through stronger 
law and order. Decentralization of expenditure has a positive effect on growth when coupled 
with high democracy and low corruption. The effect on growth of a shared-rule of fiscal 
powers is likely to be affected by democracy and quality of governance. Meanwhile, in the 
latter case (i.e. inequality equation), based on observations across 56 developing countries in 
the period 1990 to 2014, findings show that the kind of fiscal authority has a significant effect 
on distribution of income and ethnic inequality. This depends on whether developing 
countries reach the optimum level of institution and defense spending. 
To sum up, this thesis shows that institutional quality plays a significant role as a driver of 
regional proliferation in Indonesia and fiscal decentralization in developing countries. 
Additionally, at the very least, process-based and outcome-based measures of institutional 
quality are very effective to reduce inequality and to enhance economic growth in developing 






Dit proefschrift beschrijft onderzoek naar de determinanten van regionale proliferatie in 
Indonesië en fiscale decentralisatie in ontwikkelingslanden. Daarnaast geeft het een verklaring 
voor het mediërende effect van institutionele kwaliteit op het verband tussen fiscale 
decentralisatie, groei en ongelijkheid in ontwikkelingslanden. 
Het proefschrift bestaat uit drie delen. Het eerste deel bevat de analyse van de stuwende 
krachten achter regionale proliferatie (pemekaran genaamd) als gevolg van de invoering van 
decentralisatie in Indonesië. Een kwalitatieve analyse van de motieven voor pemekaran in 
Indonesië dient om de econometrische resultaten op interprovinciaal niveau aan te vullen. Uit 
onderzoek naar de periode van 2007 tot 2014 blijkt dat indicatoren voor de institutionele 
kwaliteit, in de vorm van de hoeveelheid administratieve goedkeuringen en sociaal kapitaal, 
positief en significant samenhangen met het aantal gevallen van regionale proliferatie. Verder 
blijkt dat intergouvernementele fiscale overdrachten en inkomen per hoofd van de bevolking 
geen motief kunnen zijn voor regionale proliferatie in Indonesië. Daarnaast is er een 
significant positief verband tussen etnische versplintering en het optreden van regionale 
proliferatie in Indonesië. Tegelijkertijd blijkt uit de kwalitatieve resultaten in West-Java en 
Banten dat territoriale coalities er wel degelijk toe doen en dat er politieke, economische en 
bureaucratische motieven voor pemekaran zijn. 
Terwijl het eerste deel gericht is op verschillende aspecten van fiscale decentralisatie op 
nationaal niveau, ligt in de volgende delen de nadruk op de macro-dimensie van het aandeel 
van inkomsten en uitgaven en op de fiscale autoriteit van de subnationale overheden op 
transnationaal niveau. Op basis van data in de Government Financial Statistics (GFS) en de 
Regional Authority Index (RAI) worden in het tweede deel de determinanten van fiscale 
decentralisatie in ontwikkelingslanden toegelicht. In dit proefschrift wordt betoogd dat de 
verschillende institutionele vormen van fiscale decentralisatie die in ontwikkelingslanden 
worden waargenomen afhankelijk zijn van de kwaliteit van de instellingen. In het bijzonder 
kunnen beleidsmakers andere motieven hebben (bijvoorbeeld politieke weerstand en 
uitdagingen) om de mate van fiscale bevoegdheden te veranderen. Deze waarneming is 
gebaseerd op een vijfjarig gemiddelde in de periode tussen 1990 en 2014 in 56 
ontwikkelingslanden. De bevindingen wijzen duidelijk op een niet-lineair verband tussen 
institutionele kwaliteit en een aantal indicatoren van fiscale decentralisatie. Aangezien 
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democratie (staatsbestel), rechtsorde en fiscale decentralisatie alle evolueren vanuit een laag 
ontwikkelingsniveau, zal naarmate deze institutionele kwaliteitsvariabelen verder in omvang 
toenemen in deze context respectievelijk de mate van fiscale autonomie en de mate van 
uitgavendecentralisatie verder verminderen. 
Op basis van de resultaten van het tweede deel wordt in het derde deel besproken hoe 
fiscale decentralisatie groei en ongelijkheid in ontwikkelingslanden beïnvloedt. Wat betreft de 
groeivergelijking blijkt uit de resultaten dat groei afhankelijk is van het niveau van de fiscale 
autoriteit en haar interactie met de instellingen. Deze bevinding is gebaseerd op 
waarnemingen in 46 ontwikkelingslanden van 1990 tot 2014. Decentralisatie van inkomsten 
leidt tot een hogere economische groei door een versterking van de rechtsorde. Decentralisatie 
van uitgaven heeft een positief effect op de groei wanneer er tegelijkertijd een hoge mate van 
democratie en weinig corruptie is. Het effect van een gedeelde fiscale macht op groei wordt 
waarschijnlijk beïnvloed door democratie en bestuurskwaliteit. Wat betreft de 
ongelijkheidsvergelijking blijkt uit waarnemingen in 56 ontwikkelingslanden in de periode 
1990-2014 dat het soort fiscale autoriteit een significant effect heeft op inkomensverdeling en 
etnische ongelijkheid. Dit is afhankelijk van de vraag of ontwikkelingslanden het optimale 
niveau van institutionele en defensie-uitgaven bereiken. 
Samenvattend blijkt uit dit proefschrift dat institutionele kwaliteit een belangrijke rol speelt 
als aanjager van regionale proliferatie in Indonesië en fiscale decentralisatie in 
ontwikkelingslanden. Bovendien zijn procesmatige en op uitkomsten gebaseerde maatstaven 
van institutionele kwaliteit zeer effectief om ongelijkheid te verminderen en economische 
groei in ontwikkelingslanden te bevorderen. Daarom is het te verwachten dat dergelijke 







Over the last several decades, many central governments have essentially devolved their 
political, administrative, and fiscal authorities to sub-national governments. According to data 
gathered by Garman et al. (2001, as cited in Sugiyanto et al., 2018), more than sixty 
developing countries analyzed had been implementing decentralization by the beginning of 
the millennium. Since then, the trend has only increased to involve all of the world’s regions. 
Based on the large number of developing countries implementing decentralization, Faguet 
(2014, as cited in Sugiyanto et al., 2018) sheds some light on the reason behind this 
phenomenon. Some policy-makers in Bolivia and Egypt view decentralization as a means of 
re-balancing the power between citizens and government in the hope that the effective 
participation by citizens in decision-making, the deepening of democracy, the satisfaction of 
collective necessities, and the level of socio-economic development will increase. Meanwhile, 
policy-makers in Peru, Cambodia, Mexico, and Tanzania emphasize reduction of inequality of 
access as the goal of decentralization, along with improving citizen participation and 
democracy, as well as strengthening public accountability and government effectiveness in 
public service delivery. On the other hand, some decentralization movements in Colombia  
and Ethiopia have been designed by their policy-makers to reduce ethnic conflicts, and/or 
separatist movements. 
From the explanations above, it is clear that decentralization in developing countries is 
regarded as a panacea to improve economic efficiency, to increase resource mobilization and 
accountability, as well as to reduce inequality in their sub-national governments. However, 
some argue that it is almost impossible to achieve these objectives in developing countries 
(Bird & Vaillancourt, 1999). In addition to the problems of institutional capacity in local 
governments, the preferences of local citizens are sometimes not accommodated in the budget 
by their policy-makers. Political leaders may have thought that decentralization could provide 
people at grass roots level with a new kind of politics that would divert their attention from 
systems of patronage distribution (Manor, 1999). However, many politicians do not see 
decentralization as an alternative to patronage systems, but as a device to extend and to renew 
those systems. Indeed, there is evidence that decentralization tends to worsen economic 
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efficiency, inequality, and macroeconomic stability in developing countries (Prud’homme, 
1995). 
Moving from these debates, fiscal decentralization or decentralization in general can be 
differentiated into three types that refer to the degree of decision-making implemented 
independently by sub-national governments (Bird & Vaillancourt, 1999). First, delegation, 
whereby sub-national governments act as agents for the central government, and implement 
certain administrative, fiscal, and political functions on its behalf. Second, devolution, in 
which local governments have full authority to decide and to implement these functions. 
Third, deconcentration, which involves distribution of responsibilities from the central 
government to some sub-national administrative units. Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003) 
argue that the process of fiscal decentralization is closely related to either delegation or 
devolution of fiscal authority, including the decision-making power on the composition and 
the level of revenues and expenditures by sub-national governments. However, policy-makers 
in developing countries such as Vietnam, Ukraine, and regions of Central Asia prefer to 
conceptualize decentralization as a geographical deconcentration in delivering public goods 
and services (Martinez-Vazquez & McNab, 2003). Thus, a better assessment of 
decentralization in developing countries depends to some extent on the identification of these 
three varieties. 
The evaluation of fiscal decentralization or decentralization in general also depends on the 
rationale for decentralization, which can be explained either through the bottom-up or the top- 
down approach (Bird & Vaillancourt, 1999). The bottom-up approach focuses on the 
improvement of institutional quality at the local level, in which the heterogeneity of 
preferences among different territorial units is very high, as emerges in India (Rao, 1999) and 
South Africa (Ahmad, 1999). Basically, both efficiency and redistribution functions among 
local governments cannot be optimally achieved if a central government does not delegate or 
devolve its power to sub-national governments, since they possess the knowledge related to 
the preferences of their citizens (Hayek, 1945). This delegation of power can enhance 
transparency and accountability among sub-national governments, as well as stimulate 
participation by local citizens, which then leads to more trust of government and results in 
increased government legitimacy and political stability (Bird & Vaillancourt, 1999). Those 
micro objectives at the sub-national level will contribute at the national level to an even 
greater improvement of welfare. In contrast, the top-down approach stresses the national 
policy agenda, as mentioned by Faguet (2014). Such is the case when a central government 
wants to delegate or to decentralize the fiscal authority to their sub-national governments in a 
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bid to obtain its allocative goals, as appears in China (Bahl, 1999), Indonesia (Shah, 1999), 
and Colombia (Bird & Fiszbein, 1999). In addition, there may even be a case where a central 
government uses decentralization as a means of shifting the burden of budget deficits to its 
sub-national governments with a hope to relax national political pressures (Bird & 
Vaillancourt, 1999). 
Given the motivations for developing countries to decentralize, in general, a formal 
approach on how economists view fiscal decentralization has been traced by a public finance 
theorist. Musgrave (1959) points out that fiscal decentralization is a system that permits 
different groups living in various states to express different preferences on public services. 
Thus, he stresses the discretion of sub-national governments to formulate and implement 
policies that truly reflect the preferences of their residents. Since then, the popularity of fiscal 
decentralization has become a central discussion among many economists. Oates (1972) 
developed a decentralization theorem, which states that as local citizens have various 
preferences and different needs, a sub-national government’s role in the provision of public 
goods and services becomes increasingly important to improve their welfare. Specifically, 
Oates (1999) states that local governments are much closer to local citizens since they have 
knowledge of local preferences that central governments do not possess. Thus, 
decentralization is needed to increase economic efficiency in the allocation of resources in 
public sectors. 
Oates’s theorem presented above assumes that no inter-jurisdictional spillover effects are 
associated with the public goods since the benefits of consuming these goods are limited to 
individuals within the jurisdiction. Here the distance between the provision level of public 
goods and the true preferences of local citizens can influence the potential benefits of 
decentralization. Moreover, a uniform level of provision of public goods tends to be 
inefficient, since each region has different socio-economic characteristics. In principle, public 
goods have two main properties, namely: non-rivalry and non-excludability (Musgrave, 
1959). The non-rivalry assumption holds when the addition of individuals does not diminish 
the amount available to others, while the non-excludability property holds when no one can  
be excluded from its consumption. Here, Samuelson (1954) points out that the problem of 
non-excludability as a decentralized mechanism to obtain optimal public good provision is 
that it is very difficult to reveal users’ true preferences due to the free-riding problem. 
Consequently, there is no market solution for public goods. 
However, Tiebout (1956) challenges this argument. He states that when citizens have the 
option to choose the jurisdiction which provides them with the best net benefit, the demand of 
4  
consumers for local public goods can be revealed. In this case, homogeneous groups will be 
formed naturally, and their demand for certain public goods and services will be equal. Based 
on the work by Tiebout, the theory of club goods evolved, beginning with the work by 
Buchanan (1965), and followed by Cornes and Sandler (1996). In principle, not everyone in 
society has the same preferences, and participation is not universally voluntary. Thus, only 
members can receive the benefits from club goods. However, as the increased size of club 
membership reduces the cost of providing club goods, this may lead to congestion or 
crowding cost, a situation where one agent’s consumption diminishes the quantity and/or 
quality of the goods available to others (Sandler, 2003). The critical point is that the provision 
of local public goods is closer to the characteristic of club goods. Hence, fiscal 
decentralization may achieve optimal provision of club goods. 
Efficiency in the allocation of resources is one of the objectives of decentralization. The 
traditional argument of public finance theory also emphasizes macroeconomic stability and 
income redistribution. In the former (i.e. stability), both Gramlich (1993) and Spahn (1998) 
argue that macroeconomic stability cannot be achieved in decentralized systems if sub- 
national governments cannot contain shocks to the economy that should be symmetrically 
distributed among local citizens. Additionally, the same applies when decentralization leads  
to a less transparent assignment of responsibilities at all levels of government (Shah, 1999). 
Hence, based on these conditions, the stabilization of macroeconomic by sub-national 
governments is unlikely to be attained due to potential economic inefficiencies in local 
government expenditures. 
Meanwhile, in the latter (i.e. redistribution), many sub-national governments should be 
involved in redistribution policies (Bahl et al., 2002). In this context, decentralized 
redistribution enhances the competition among local governments. This creates ‘voting by the 
feet’ incentives, whereby poor households move to jurisdictions that provide more generous 
redistribution schemes, while the rich shift to other jurisdictions with minimal tax and transfer 
schemes (Tiebout, 1956). However, one will argue that such fiscal mobility yields a zero-sum 
or even a negative-sum game that breeds new economic cost for all competing regions 
(Martinez-Vazquez & McNab, 2003). The loser regions will potentially spend more subsidy 
for poor households, while at the same time they will potentially receive less, or even lose tax 
revenues from the rich. Hence, from a dissenting point of view, central government should 
play a dominant role in redistribution if both redistributive policy and the preference of local 
people on public goods and services are uniform in all jurisdictions (Oates, 1972). 
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The rationales for and the traditional objectives of decentralization have led to the growth 
of empirical studies that seek to investigate the potential determinants of fiscal 
decentralization and its effect on economic growth and inequality. However, in general, 
scholarship focuses on either single-country analysis or cross-country studies, which mostly 
use either developed countries, notably OECD countries, or a combination of developing and 
developed countries as objects of analysis.1 In addition, even if there are cross-country studies 
available, these studies tend to focus mainly on the impact of political decentralization, while 
the fiscal dimension of decentralization has received considerably less attention.2 Thus, this 
study will offer a fresh exploration of the literature on the determinants of fiscal 
decentralization and the relationship between fiscal decentralization, growth, and inequality in 
developing countries. 
Furthermore, one of the key challenges facing cross-country research in the area is the 
quality of data on fiscal decentralization. Most scholars use the Government Financial 
Statistics (GFS) dataset provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).3 Although GFS 
has consistent definitions across countries over time, it ignores the degree of central 
governments’ control over local revenues and expenditures. These measurement errors mean 
that the degree of fiscal decentralization tends to be overestimated. In addition, the GFS 
aggregates all sub-national governments into a single group, which does not take into account 
the number of sub-national governments within the country, the types of intergovernmental 
transfers, and the differences of revenue and expenditure among sub-national governments.4 
In line with the measurement of fiscal decentralization indicators, the concept of inequality 
proposed by several scholars has also been subject to measurement problems.5 The most 
common measure of inequality is the Gini coefficient, which can be defined in terms of 
income or consumption, and either for individuals or households. According to Tadjoeddin et 
 
1 For the case of economic growth, see Thornton (2007); Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2011); Baskaran and Feld 
(2013); Gemmell et al. (2013). For the case of inequality, see Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez (2011); Sacchi 
and Salotti (2014). For the case of the determinant of fiscal decentralization, Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) as 
well as Bodman and Hodge (2010). 
2 For the case of economic growth, see Iimi (2005). For the case of inequality, see Cavusoglu and Dincer (2015). 
3 For the case of determinant of fiscal decentralization, see Arzaghi and Henderson (2005). For the case of 
economic growth, see Gemmell et al. (2013). For the case of inequality, see Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez 
(2011). 
4 Most studies empirically examine fiscal decentralization as the local share of total government expenditure 
since it represents the authority of local government to make decisions related to types of expenditure (Davoodi 
& Zou, 1998). Others use the revenue structure of sub-national governments (Ebel & Yilmaz, 2002a), since local 
governments must be given the authority to exercise ‘own-source’ taxation, and that has important implications 
for the outcome of the fiscal decentralization process. In this research, since the data were largely discontinued 
after 2001, the GFS dataset will be supplemented by the RAI dataset. 
5 For example, Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez (2011) use the Gini Coefficient obtained from the World 
Income Inequality Database. 
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al. (2016), the Gini coefficient is a common measurement of vertical inequality, which they 
refer to as inequality in a population. However, it cannot capture horizontal inequality, which 
refers to inequality between different ethno-social groups or regions. 
To address all of these limitations, I will deconstruct the Regional Authority Index (RAI) 
compiled by Hooghe et al. (2016) and create a new proxy of fiscal decentralization indicator.6 
Here, fiscal decentralization sums the score of fiscal autonomy and borrowing autonomy 
across all tiers of government. To my knowledge, the RAI dataset has been used by Bartolini 
and Santolini (2013), Carreras (2016), and Tranchant (2016) to measure the effect of 
decentralization on governance, inequality, and conflict, respectively. As a proxy for 
horizontal inequality, I propose using ethnic group political inequality, based on the Ethnic 
Power Relations (EPR) dataset (Vogt et al., 2015). This dataset has been used by several 
scholars mainly for conflict studies. With this growing availability of relevant data, the 
proposed research will make a timely contribution to the current literature. 
Moving from measurement issues, most studies do not explicitly address the endogeneity 
issue. The debate mostly centers on whether decentralization refers to the cause of certain 
outcomes, or constitutes the effect of inequality or economic growth. In general, the direction 
of causation is at least debatable. The potential problem of endogeneity is likely to be a 
concern in a pure cross-country analysis. In the case of the determinant of fiscal 
decentralization and its effect on growth and inequality, most studies simply rely on simple 
pooled estimations, fixed effects, and random effects.7 The instrumental variable (IV) 
technique might be appropriate, but finding the right instrument to tackle the reverse causality 
issue can be problematic.8 To deal with this problem, I use the lagged values of endogenous 







6 The Regional Autonomy Index (RAI) sums the score for self-rule and shared-rule. Self-rule is measured as the 
sum of five indicators: institutional depth, policy scope, fiscal autonomy, borrowing autonomy and 
representation. Shared-rule is measured as the sum of five indicators: law making, executive control, fiscal 
control, borrowing control, and constitutional reform. My understanding of the fiscal decentralization indicator 
in the dataset revolves around the degree of decision-making implemented independently by sub-national 
governments (self-rule) and the capacity of sub-national governments to determine the central government’s 
decision-making (shared-rule). 
7 For the case of economic growth, see Davoodi and Zou (1998); Woller and Phillips (1998); and Rodriguez- 
Pose and Ezcurra (2011). For the case of inequality, see Goerl and Seiferling (2014). For the case of determinant 
of fiscal decentralization, see Panizza (1999); Arzaghi and Henderson (2005). 
8 For example, Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez (2011) use openness in trade as a proxy to mitigate the 
endogeneity issue in the relationship between fiscal decentralization and inequality. However, this variable 
constitutes a control variable of income inequality. 
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Moreover, the role of institutional quality on fiscal decentralization, growth, and inequality 
has largely been ignored by several scholars in their research.9 In this study, institutions play a 
significant part in forming two hypotheses. On the one hand, they can be a determinant of 
fiscal decentralization. On the other hand, coupled with this type of decentralization, they 
have an intermediate effect on both growth and inequality (see Figure 1.1). In the former (i.e. 
a determinant), given other factors such as income per capita, size of country, number of 
population, as well as ethnic fractionalization, my argument is based on the premise that fiscal 
decentralization or decentralization in general can be more effective in a country if central 
government delegates specific and important responsibilities to sub-national governments 
through a clear and strong constitution (Manor, 1999). For example, India delegates specific 
powers to the central government, the state government, and others concurrently (Hankla, 
2008). This may also be the case with constitutions in the more established democracies and 
institutions of Western Europe whereby authority is shared among different levels of 
government (Norton, 1991). Such a cooperative approach involves policy formulation and 
implementation between the central and sub-national governments. 
Figure 1.1 Two Hypotheses on Institutional Quality 
 
In addition to constitution, the effectiveness of fiscal decentralization or decentralization in 
general depends on the powers of sub-national governments to levy taxes. According to Oates 
(1972), officials of sub-national governments will not have the incentive to overspend, since 
they have the authority to change both the priorities and size of the sub-national government. 
In the absence of sub-national taxing authority, unconditional intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers by central governments are also needed to ensure that sub-national governments 
 
 
9 For cases of the determinants of fiscal decentralization, see Panizza (1999); Arzaghi and Henderson (2005); 
Canavire-Bacarreza et al. (2016); Jametti and Joanis (2016); as well as Bodman and Hodge (2010). For the case 
of economic growth, see Thornton (2007); and Bodman (2008). For the case of inequality, see Goerl and 
Seiferling (2014). 
8  
implement their priorities (Manor, 1999). Aside from revenue powers, a strong rule of law is 
required to guarantee that sub-national governments have discretion over expenditures since 
they have the information and knowledge to match priorities to the preferences of their 
citizens. But in terms of revenue and expenditure, fiscally independent sub-national 
governments cannot run their functions properly if they have a problem with administrative 
capacity (Manor, 1999). Hence, good governance quality is a vital for effective 
decentralization. 
Quality of government or governance is measured by the output/outcome based metrics of 
an institution (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008; Murshed et al., 2015). But, such a concept is 
somehow deficient if it does not correspond to the input/process based measures of an 
institution. Hence, Rothstein and Teorell (2008) propose a form of democracy that reflects 
electoral regimes. In this context, decentralization can be implemented effectively if officials 
in sub-national institutions are democratically elected; in this case fair elections can provide 
an incentive for responsiveness to their local electorate (Hankla, 2008). This will in turn lead 
the democratically elected leaders to deliver the quality of government that local citizens 
desire (Bird & Vaillancourt, 1999).10 
About the latter (i.e. the intermediate effect), my hypothesis is that the potential benefits of 
fiscal decentralization or decentralization in general on the efficiency of allocation of 
resources and income redistribution depend on institutional quality. In this context, instead of 
the top-down (i.e. supply-driven) approach, I argue that the bottom-up (i.e. demand-driven) 
approach to redistribution schemes as well as to public goods and services may facilitate 
decentralization reforms in developing countries aimed at achieving these objectives. For 
example, based on experiments with social investment funds, Glaessner et al. (1994) showed 
that a number of Latin American countries performed well in redistribution and efficiency 
since they involved a high number of stakeholders within sub-national governments. Their 
operations were transparent and correctly targeted to low-income groups. 
The Latin American experience can be an entry point to explain the intermediate effect of 
political accountability. In principle, both the interjurisdictional competition à la Tiebout 
(1956) and heterogeneity preferences à la Oates (1972) -- that play a significant role through 
which fiscal decentralization is expected to increase efficiency in allocation and hinder the 
capability of central government to suppress inequality -- are related to the political incentives 
 
10 Aside from electoral competitiveness, a stable party system at the sub-national level can breed governance 
quality in terms of government stability at all levels of government. In the past, India could be a good case study 
(see Hankla, 2008). 
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of local officials, which should be matched with those of the majority of voters. In order to 
equitably distribute taxes and transfers as well as to deliver public goods and services 
according to their preferences, local officials can use ‘voice’ mechanism that ensures they are 
democratically elected and are responsive to their constituents. An empirical study conducted 
by Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) in 75 developing countries shows that fiscal 
decentralization can enhance efficiency and distribution if local government officials are not 
appointed by the central government. In Bolivia, a similar result was also found in Faguet’s 
(2014) analysis, where these benefits of decentralization occur through the voice of local 
citizens. 
From these examples, it is clear that accountability can serve as a control of behavior of 
local policy-makers, which confirms that their resources are spent efficiently and the 
beneficiaries of redistribution schemes are chosen properly. There is also a potential scenario 
that fiscal decentralization can hamper efficiency and distribution, ultimately effecting 
economic growth and inequality, even if they are democratically elected. Such a condition 
takes place when local government positions are captured by local elites (Bardhan & 
Mookherjee, 2000). This phenomenon creates several problems related to the high costs of 
providing goods and services, the redirection of benefits to unintended groups, and  
corruption. Hence, strengthening the accountability of local officials is one of the 
prerequisites to guarantee optimal efficiency and distribution. However, increasing fiscal 
authority without improving the capacity and competency of local officers, political 
responsibility, and a strong constitution to establish the division of powers between the central 
and sub-national governments can be detrimental factors in growth-promoting and inequality- 
reducing policies. 
Based on several clarifications above, I conceptualize the role of institutional quality by 
using the concepts of Murshed et al. (2015), and Rothstein and Teorell (2008). They view 
institutions as either process/input based or outcome/output based.11 According to Murshed et 
al. (2015), process-based quality is related to the degree of democracy or autocracy, whereby 
the outcome of institutional quality can be quantified by quality of governance. Another 
explanation comes from Rothstein and Teorell (2008). According to them, government as an 
institution regulates the relation to its citizens in two dimensions: the input side is related to 
access to public authority (i.e. democracy), while the output side corresponds to the way in 
11 Another scholar, Zhuang et al. (2010) provides a brief description of how institutions can be linked with 
democracy and governance. He briefly, à la North, argues that influence of all actors and sectors in society can 
be applied in a larger context. For example, in the determination of policy, its implementation and outcomes. 
These are the entry points for governance and democracy. 
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which authority is exercised (i.e. government quality or governance). Thus, my contribution 
in this research is to examine the role of institutional quality as the determinant of fiscal 
decentralization and to explore the mediating role of institutional quality on the relationship 
between fiscal decentralization, growth, and inequality. 
Apart from quality of institution, another contribution of this thesis is to examine the role 
of military expenditure in the fiscal decentralization–inequality nexus. The study conducted 
by Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez (2011) shows that the size of general government 
expenditures plays an important role in the relationship between fiscal decentralization and 
inequality. As defense spending constitutes a considerable proportion of these, I believe that it 
creates the tragedy of the commons, particularly when the scope of conflict mitigation is 
shared across jurisdictions and is financed through a common pool of resources. 
In addition to augmenting the existing literature, one of the important contributions of this 
thesis is, by applying a case study in Indonesia, to seek a connection between local 
government proliferation (pemekaran) and the country’s overall decentralization policies. 
Indonesia’s decentralization project, begun in 1999, is implemented through two major 
policies, namely: regional autonomy and regional proliferation. Pemekaran can be viewed as 
a form of regional autonomy. As a result, a new autonomous region has fiscal, administrative, 
and political autonomy. My econometric results in this case study will be supplemented by  
the qualitative method, whereby I conduct interviews and FGD with multiple stakeholders at 
national, provincial, and local levels regarding the process of local government formation as 
stated on PP No. 78/2007 and Law No. 23/2014.12 In addition, their rent seeking behavior will 
be investigated to capture the nuances of political economy motives.13 
The main objectives of the thesis are thus, first, to investigate the determinants of regional 
proliferation and fiscal decentralization; second, to explain the direct and mediating effect of 
institutional quality on the relationship between fiscal decentralization, growth, and 
inequality; and third, to clarify the role of military expenditure in the fiscal decentralization– 
inequality nexus. 






12 The selection criteria on local government will be further elaborated in the methodology section in Essay 1. 
13 For political motives, one might argue that pemekaran creates new opportunities to have new leaders and 
members of local parliaments. Moreover, opportunities for new echelons may open in the new regions, 
particularly for bureaucrats who have no position in the parent regions. 
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1. What are the drivers of regional proliferation in Indonesia? To what extent can 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers and institutional quality play a significant role in 
driving pemekaran? 
2. What are the determinants of fiscal decentralization in developing countries? To what 
extent does institutional quality drive fiscal decentralization in developing countries? 
3. To what extent can institutional quality explain the fiscal decentralization–growth and 
fiscal decentralization–inequality nexuses in developing countries? 
4. To what extent can military expenditure elucidate the nexus between fiscal 
decentralization and inequality in developing countries? 
These questions are addressed in three parts. The first part of the thesis (corresponding to 
chapter 2) will describe a case study in Indonesia to investigate the drivers of regional 
proliferation as a consequence of the implementation of decentralization in Indonesia. Here, a 
qualitative analysis on the motivation behind pemekaran in Indonesia is expected to 
complement econometric results at cross-province level. In the second part (corresponding to 
chapter 3), I will conduct analysis related to the determinants of fiscal decentralization in 
developing countries. This part will explain the significance of the role of institutional quality 
in driving fiscal decentralization in developing countries. Based on the result from the second 
part, the third part will consist of two essays (corresponding to chapters 4 and 5), which are 
devoted to describing the effect of fiscal decentralization on growth and inequality in 
developing countries. Here, I will discuss the contribution of institutional quality, as well as 






This thesis deals with several main issues. First, I examine the factors that drive territorial 
splits (pemekaran) in Indonesia and fiscal decentralization in developing countries. I also 
investigate the effects of fiscal decentralization on growth and inequality in developing 
countries. Second, to tackle the drawbacks of GFS-style measures, I introduce a new metrics 
of fiscal decentralization based on the fiscal authority of sub-national governments. Similarly, 
to gauge inequality between different ethno-social groups or regions, I utilize several 
measures of ethnic group political inequality. Last, in the analysis I focus on the crucial 
importance of institutional quality, in terms of process and outcome, and military expenditure. 
This thesis is divided into three parts. The first part is devoted to analysis of several factors 
that contribute to pemekaran and to assessment of whether institutional quality can play a 
significant role in the number of regional-proliferation events in Indonesia. The quantitative 
findings show that institutional quality indicators, gauged by social capital and level of 
administrative approvals, are significantly and positively correlated with the number of 
pemekaran events in Indonesia. Furthermore, neither fiscal transfer nor income can be a 
strong motive for regions in Indonesia to split. The qualitative findings in West Java and 
Banten corroborate the quantitative results, that fiscal issues do not provide a significant 
motive for creating new districts or cities. Instead, administrative requirements as stated in 
both PP No. 78/2007 and Law No. 23/2014, and collective action à la Grootaert and van 
Bastelaer (2001), do exist in the territorial splits process. Additionally, there is evidence of 
political, economic, and bureaucratic rent-seeking motives. While quality of institution is an 
important factor causing regions of Indonesia to proliferate, in my case study the qualitative 
findings cannot confirm that ethnic fractionalization is a driver of pemekaran. Therefore, 
whether this result is applicable either to other regions or to developing countries remains a 
topic for future research 
The second part examines the role of institutional quality as a driver of fiscal 
decentralization in developing countries. Specifically, as policy-makers at either side of the 
range of median institutional quality may be susceptible to other incentives to alter the 
direction of policy away from decentralization, the institutional quality–fiscal decentralization 
nexus can be nonlinear. In this context, the relationship can be well explained in terms of the 
input or process-based (i.e. democracy) and the output or outcome-based (i.e. law and order) 
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measures of institutional quality. As democracy (polity), law and order, as well as degrees of 
fiscal decentralization, all arise from low levels of development, a further increase in the 
levels of these variables of institutional quality will further reduce the degrees of fiscal 
autonomy and expenditure decentralization, respectively. Important to note is that my study 
implies that the design, nature, and extent of decentralization do not depend solely on whether 
policy-makers can accommodate political partisans and obstacles. Aside from fiscal crisis, 
some officials in sub-national governments may have the incentive to spend their budget 
inefficiently. Moreover, corrupt officials in central governments may resist decentralization 
because they want to increase their degrees of rent-seeking at the sub-national level. Whether 
this finding can be generalized to a single country analysis or other cross-regional studies 
within developing countries (e.g. ASEAN and MENA countries) is a question for future 
research. However, at least in a large sample of developing countries, quality of institution 
determines variety of fiscal authority. 
The third part explains the effects of fiscal decentralization on growth and inequality in 
developing countries. In the growth equation, varieties of fiscal decentralization and growth 
can be best described in terms of process-based and outcome-based measures of institutional 
quality. Assigning more revenue collection to sub-national governments (i.e. revenue 
decentralization) can promote growth through a better level of law and order. In addition, one 
source of efficiency is associated with the willingness of local governments to diversify 
spending in line with the preferences of local citizens. Hence, expenditure decentralization  
has a positive effect on growth, subject to a better implementation of electoral and liberal 
democracy and the ability of sub-national governments to control the risk of corruption. 
Another interesting result is the effect of shared-rule on growth. Increasing the level of co- 
sharing has a negative effect on growth in lower levels of governance (i.e. government and 
bureaucratic) quality and non-democracy settings. However, shared-rule makes a positive 
contribution to growth through a greater degree of law and order, as well quality of 
bureaucracy. My study presents a crucial implication, that the negative effect of fiscal 
decentralization on growth should not be used to endorse support of centralized government 
systems. In fact, policy makers at both sub-national and central government levels should find 
a way to improve political accountability, as well as managerial and administrative capacity in 
their countries in order to minimize the potentially negative impact of decentralization on 
growth. 
Regarding the inequality equation, I find that different institutional settings of fiscal 
decentralization in developing countries can significantly contribute to distribution of income 
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and to ethnic inequality. On the one hand, when sub-national governments in these countries 
independently implement their revenue and expenditure responsibilities, as well taxing and 
borrowing policies, these all have a positive effect on vertical inequality. However, 
developing countries can actually improve the distribution of income if they reach a certain 
degree of democracy, bureaucratic quality, and military expenditure. The situation is totally 
different when central and sub-national governments take a cooperative approach to 
redistribution issues, as this has a negative effect on vertical inequality. Such an association 
can, to some extent, be explained through the channels of military expenditure, and law and 
order. On the other hand, the degree of regional authority plays a significant role in reducing 
horizontal inequality. In this context, sub-national governments can either carry out taxing  
and borrowing policies independently, or share such policies with the central government. 
Reduction of horizontal inequality can be achieved either through better implementation of 
democracy for self-rule, or a stronger rule of law for shared-rule. Additionally, the 
implementation of self-rule in developing countries requires an optimal degree of defense 
spending to more effectively reduce ethnic inequality. Thus, my study provides an important 
contribution regarding the links between varieties of fiscal authority and inequality. 
All in all, whether the findings of this thesis in relation to Indonesia and developing 
countries are considered conventional or bizarre, this study is a work in progress. To some 
extent, the results suggest that institutional quality can be a driver for a region to proliferate, 
and can determine fiscal decentralization. Institutional quality also plays a significant role in 
the fiscal authority–growth nexus. Together with military spending, it can have an 




A1.1 Detailed List of FGDs 
 
 
No Activities Date and Location Participants 
1 FGD with national- 
government stakeholders 
3 June 2019, 17.00 – 18.30 
Room 2.21 at University of 
National, Jakarta 
1 person from Directorate of Regional Autonomy (MoHA), 1 person 
from Directorate of Balancing Fund (MoF), and 2 persons from 
Directorate of Regional Autonomy (Bappenas) 
2 FGD with national-watchdog 
members 
28 May 2019, 18.30 – 19.30 
Room 3.11 at University of 
National, Jakarta 
2 persons from Committee for Monitoring Regional Autonomy 
(KPPOD), and 2 persons from Indonesia Forum for Budget 
Transparency (FITRA) 
3 FGD with bureaucrats in 
District of Ciamis 
7 May 2019, 08.30 – 10.00 
Bappeda Office at District of 
Ciamis 
2 persons from Local Secretariat (Setda), 2 persons from Local 
Development Planning Unit (Bappeda), and 1 person from Local 
Finance Unit (Keuda) 
4 FGD with bureaucrats in 
District of Tangerang 
13 June 2019, 13.00 – 14.30 
Bappeda Office at District of 
Tangerang 
1 person from Local Secretariat (Setda), 3 persons from Local 
Development Planning Unit (Bappeda), and 1 person from Local 
Finance Unit (Keuda) 
5 FGD with bureaucrats in 
District of Pangandaran 
29 April 2019, 16.30 – 18.00 
Bappeda Office at District of 
Pangandaran 
2 persons from Local Secretariat (Setda), 2 persons from Local 
Development Planning Unit (Bappeda), and 1 person from Local 
Finance Unit (Keuda) 
6 FGD with bureaucrats in City 
of South Tangerang 
11 June 2019, 11.30 – 13.00 
Bappeda Office at City of South 
Tangerang 
1 person from Local Secretariat (Setda), 2 persons from Local 
Development Planning Unit (Bappeda), and 1 person from Local 
Finance Unit (Keuda) 
 
 
A1.2 FGDs Guidelines 
 
1. LIST OF QUESTIONS FOR FGD WITH NATIONAL GOVERNMENT STAKEHOLDERS (JAKARTA) 
 
 FGD DESCRIPTION 
This FGD is part of my research investigating the determinants of regional proliferation in Indonesia. I use a sequential explanatory strategy, 
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characterized by collection and analysis of quantitative data in the first phase of research, followed by collection and analysis of qualitative  
data in the second phase, built on the results of the quantitative analysis. 
During the first phase of research, I already conducted a negative binomial regression analysis whereby the dependent variable, regional 
proliferation, is treated as event. Specifically, I want to estimate whether institutional quality indicators, proxied by social capital, democracy, 
and crime rates, have a significant effect on the degree of regional proliferation in Indonesia. In the analysis, I also considered several motives 
of regional proliferation such as fiscal incentive (the share of intergovernmental transfers), income (GRDP per capita), population, area, and 
ethnic fractionalization. My period of observation covers the years 2007 to 2014 in 32 provinces. 
REGIONAL PROLIFERATION POLICY IN INDONESIA 
1. As we already knew, regional proliferation is one of the regional arrangement policies in Indonesia. How did the central government design 
a regional proliferation policy in Indonesia as a part of the Indonesian fiscal decentralization policy? 
2. Regional proliferation in my case study is regulated comprehensively by Government Ordinance No. 78/2007, which is derived from Law 
No. 32/2004 on Local Government. In addition, our period of observation from 2007 to 2014 takes place during Soesilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono’s (SBY) administration. Can you explain the differences between the regional proliferation policy of the current administration 
(Joko Widodo) and that of SBY’s administration? 
CLARIFICATION OF QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
1. My quantitative results show that fiscal incentive and income cannot be a motive for regions in Indonesia to proliferate, but ethnic 
fractionalization and institutions do affect the extent of regional proliferation in Indonesia. Based on your experience and insight, would you 
confirm this finding? How can this be explained? 
 
2. LIST OF QUESTIONS FOR FGD WITH NATIONAL WATCHDOG (JAKARTA) 
 
FGD DESCRIPTION 
This FGD is part of my research that investigates the determinants of regional proliferation in Indonesia. I use a sequential explanatory 
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strategy, characterized by the collection and analysis of quantitative data in a first phase of research, followed by the collection and analysis of 
qualitative data in a second phase, built on the results of the quantitative analysis. 
During the first phase of research, I already conducted a negative binomial regression analysis in which the dependent variable, regional 
proliferation, is treated as an event. Specifically, I want to estimate whether institutional quality indicators, proxied by social capital, 
democracy, and crime rates, have a significant effect on the extent of regional proliferation in Indonesia. In the analysis, I also considered 
several motives of regional proliferation such as fiscal incentive (the share of intergovernmental transfers), income (GRDP per capita), 
population, area, and ethnic fractionalization. My period of observation covers the years 2007 to 2014 in 32 provinces. 
REGIONAL PROLIFERATION POLICY IN INDONESIA 
1. As we already knew, regional proliferation is one of the policies to implement decentralization in Indonesia. What is the National 
Watchdog’s view on the Central Government’s design of the regional proliferation policy in Indonesia as a part of the Indonesian fiscal 
decentralization policy? 
2. Regional proliferation in my case study is regulated comprehensively according to Government Ordinance No. 78/2007, which is derived 
from Law No. 32/2004 on Local Government. Our period of observation is from 2007 to 2014, taking place during Soesilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono’s (SBY) administration. Can you explain the differences between the regional proliferation policy of the current administration 
(Joko Widodo) and that of SBY’s administration? 
CLARIFICATION ON QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
1. My quantitative results show that fiscal incentive and income cannot be a motive for regions in Indonesia to proliferate, but ethnic 
fractionalization and institutions do matter for the extent of regional proliferation in Indonesia. Based on your experience and insight, would 
you confirm this finding? How can this be explained? 
 






This FGD is part of my research that investigates the determinants of regional proliferation in Indonesia. I use a sequential explanatory 
strategy, characterized by the collection and analysis of quantitative data in a first phase of research, followed by the collection and analysis of 
qualitative data in a second phase, built on the results of the quantitative analysis. 
During the first phase of research, I already conducted a negative binomial regression analysis where the dependent variable, regional 
proliferation, is treated as event. Specifically, I want to estimate whether institutional quality indicators, proxied by social capital, democracy, 
and crime rates, have a significant effect on the number of regional proliferation in Indonesia. In the analysis, I also considered several motives 
of regional proliferation such as fiscal incentive (the share of intergovernmental transfers), income (GRDP per capita), population, area, and 
ethnic fractionalization. My period of observation is from 2007 to 2014 in 32 provinces. 
REGIONAL PROLIFERATION POLICY IN INDONESIA 
1. As we already knew, regional proliferation is one of the policies to implement decentralization in Indonesia. How does the Provincial 
Government’s view on the Central Government’s design of the regional proliferation policy in Indonesia as a part of Indonesian fiscal 
decentralization policy? 
2. Regional proliferation in my case study is regulated comprehensively according to Government Ordinance No. 78/2007, which is derived 
from Law No. 32/2004 on Local Government. In addition, our period of observation is from 2007 to 2014, which takes place during Soesilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono’s (SBY) administration. Can you explain the difference between the regional proliferation policy of the current 
administration (Joko Widodo) and that of SBY’s administration? 
CLARIFICATION ON QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
1. My quantitative results show that fiscal incentive and income cannot be a motive for regions in Indonesia to proliferate. While ethnic 
fractionalization and institutions do matter for the number of regional proliferation in Indonesia. Based on your experience and insight, would 
you confirm this finding? How could this be explained? 
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4. LIST OF QUESTIONS FOR FGD WITH LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICERS IN PARENT REGIONS (DISTRICT OF CIAMIS AND DISTRICT 
OF TANGERANG) 
FGD DESCRIPTION 
This FGD is part of my research that investigates the determinant of regional proliferation in Indonesia. I use sequential explanatory strategy, 
characterized by the collection and analysis of quantitative data in a first phase of research, followed by the collection and analysis of 
qualitative data in a second phase, built on the results of the quantitative analysis. 
During the first phase of research, I already conducted a negative binomial regression analysis where the dependent variable, regional 
proliferation, is treated as event. Specifically, I want to estimate whether institutional quality indicators, proxied by social capital, democracy, 
and crime rates, have a significant effect on the number of regional proliferation in Indonesia. In the analysis, I also considered several motives 
of regional proliferation such as fiscal incentive (the share of intergovernmental transfers), income (GRDP per capita), population, area, and 
ethnic fractionalization. My period of observation is from 2007 to 2014 in 32 provinces. 
REGIONAL PROLIFERATION POLICY IN INDONESIA 
1. As we already knew, regional proliferation is one of the policies to implement decentralization in Indonesia. How does the Parent Regions’ 
view on the Central Government’s of regional proliferation policy in Indonesia as a part of Indonesian fiscal decentralization policy? 
2. Regional proliferation in my case study is regulated comprehensively according to Government Ordinance No. 78/2007, which is derived 
from Law No. 32/2004 on Local Government. In addition, our period of observation is from 2007 to 2014, which takes place during Soesilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono’s (SBY) administration. Can you explain the difference between the regional proliferation policy of the current 
administration (Joko Widodo) and SBY’s administration? 
CLARIFICATION ON QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
1. My quantitative results show that fiscal incentive and income cannot be a motive for regions in Indonesia to proliferate. While ethnic 
fractionalization and institutions do matter for the number of regional proliferation in Indonesia. Based on your experience and insight, would 




5. LIST OF QUESTIONS FOR FGD WITH LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICERS IN NEW AUTONOMOUS REGIONS (DISTRICT OF 
PANGANDARAN AND CITY OF SOUTH TANGERANG) 
FGD DESCRIPTION 
This FGD is part of my research that investigates the determinant of regional proliferation in Indonesia. I use sequential explanatory strategy, 
characterized by the collection and analysis of quantitative data in a first phase of research, followed by the collection and analysis of 
qualitative data in a second phase, built on the results of the quantitative analysis. 
During the first phase of research, I already conducted a negative binomial regression analysis where the dependent variable, regional 
proliferation, is treated as event. Specifically, I want to estimate whether institutional quality indicators, proxied by social capital, democracy, 
and crime rates, have a significant effect on the number of regional proliferation in Indonesia. In the analysis, I also considered several motives 
of regional proliferation such as fiscal incentive (the share of intergovernmental transfers), income (GRDP per capita), population, area, and 
ethnic fractionalization. My period of observation is from 2007 to 2014 in 32 provinces. 
REGIONAL PROLIFERATION POLICY IN INDONESIA 
1. As we already knew, regional proliferation is one of the policies to implement decentralization in Indonesia. How does the New 
Autonomous Regions’ view on the Central Government’s design of the regional proliferation policy in Indonesia as a part of Indonesian fiscal 
decentralization policy? 
2. Regional proliferation in my case study is regulated comprehensively according to Government Ordinance No. 78/2007, which is derived 
from Law No. 32/2004 on Local Government. In addition, our period of observation is from 2007 to 2014, which takes place during Soesilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono’s (SBY) administration. Can you explain the difference between the regional proliferation policy of the current 
administration (Joko Widodo) and SBY’s administration? 
CLARIFICATION ON QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 




fractionalization and institutions do matter for the number of regional proliferation in Indonesia. Based on your experience and insight, would 
you confirm this finding? How could this be explained? 
 
 
A1.3 The Detailed List of SSIs 
 
 
No Activities Date and Location Informant 
1 Interview with former member of National 
Parliament, Commission II 
4 July 2019, 18.30 – 20.00 
Hotel Hilton, Yogyakarta 
Zarkasih Noer 
2 Interview with current member of National 
Parliament, Commission II 
13 July 2019, 20.00 – 22.00 
National Parliament Office, Jakarta 
Agun Gunanjar 
3 Interview with bureaucrat at West Java 
Province 
16 May 2019, 11.00 – 13.00 
The Administrative Government Unit Office, 
Bandung 
Kusnanto 
4 Interview with academician at West Java 
Province 
10 May 2019, 08.30 – 11.30 
IPDN Office, Bandung 
Sadu Wasistiono 
5 Interview with bureaucrat at Banten 
Province 
14 June 2019, 17.00 – 18.00 
Local Secretary Office, Banten 
An unnamed source 
6 Interview with academician at Banten 
Province 
14 June 2019, 14.00 – 15.30 
Tirtayasa University Office, Banten 
Indra Suhendar 
7 Interview with chairman of local parliament 
at District of Ciamis 
8 May 2019, 09.00 – 10.30 
Local Parliament Office, Ciamis 
Nanang 
8 Interview with bureaucrat at District of 
Ciamis 
8 May 2019, 11.30 – 13.00 
Local Secretary Office, Ciamis 
Saepuddin 
9 Interview with local-watchdog member at 
District of Ciamis 
29 April 2019, 16.00 – 18.00 
Bina Pandu Mandiri Office, Ciamis 
Eka 
10 Interview with local-watchdog member at 
District of Tangerang 
11 June 2019, 18.30 – 20.00 
GERAM Office, Tangerang 
Alamsyah 
11 Interview with local-watchdog member at 
District of Pangandaran 
8 May 2019, 17.00 – 18.30 
GMBI Office, Pangandaran 
Nandang 




 District of Pangandaran House, Cimerak  
13 Interview with current head of village at 
District of Pangandaran 
30 April 2019, 14.00 – 15.30 
House, Ciparanti 
An unnamed source 
14 Interview with local-watchdog member at 
City of South Tangerang 
13 June 2019, 16.00 – 17.30 
GARDA Office, South Tangerang 
Fikri 
15 Interview with bureaucrat at City of South 
Tangerang 
18 June 2019, 09.00 – 11.00 
Local Government Unit Office, South Tangerang 
Abdul Rojak 
16 Interview with current head of village at 
City of South Tangerang 
15 June 2019, 09.00 – 10.30 
Office, Ciputat 
Unnamed source 
17 Interview with current head of village at 
City of South Tangerang 





A1.4 Interview Guidelines 
 






This interview is part of my research that investigates the determinant of regional proliferation in Indonesia. I use a sequential explanatory 
strategy, characterized by the collection and analysis of quantitative data in a first phase of research, followed by the collection and analysis of 
qualitative data in a second phase, is built on the results of the quantitative analysis. 
During the first phase of research, I already conducted a negative binomial regression analysis where the dependent variable, regional 
proliferation, is treated as event. Specifically, I want to estimate whether institutional quality indicators, proxied by social capital, democracy, 




of regional proliferation such as fiscal incentive (the share of intergovernmental transfers), income (GRDP per capita), population, area, and 
ethnic fractionalization. My period of observation is from 2007 to 2014 in 32 provinces. 
REGIONAL PROLIFERATION POLICY IN INDONESIA 
1. As we already knew, regional proliferation is one of the policies to implement decentralization in Indonesia. How does the National 
Parliament view the Central Government’s design of the regional proliferation policy in Indonesia as a part of Indonesian fiscal 
decentralization policy? 
2. Regional proliferation in my case study is regulated comprehensively according to Government Ordinance No. 78/2007, which is derived 
from Law No. 32/2004 on Local Government. In addition, our period of observation is from 2007 to 2014, which takes place during Soesilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono’s (SBY) administration. Can you explain the difference between the regional proliferation policy of the current 
administration (Joko Widodo) and SBY’s administration? 
CLARIFICATION ON QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
1. My quantitative results show that fiscal incentive and income cannot be a motive for regions in Indonesia to proliferate, but ethnic 
fractionalization and institutions do matter for the extent of regional proliferation in Indonesia. Do you confirm this finding? And do you think 
that proliferation in Indonesia is viewed as a means per se to boost local economic development and public services in new autonomous 
regions? 
2. On institutional quality, what is the role of members of the National Parliament in the decision-making process of granting a region to 
proliferate? As far as you know, is there any involvement of other actors (e.g. local elites, local businessmen, provincial elites, national elites, 
and political parties) on regional proliferation in Indonesia? If so, what is the role of those actors? How and why are such actors involved in 
regional proliferation in Indonesia? 
 









This interview is part of my research that investigates the determinant of regional proliferation in Indonesia. I use a sequential explanatory 
strategy, characterized by the collection and analysis of quantitative data in a first phase of research, followed by the collection and analysis of 
qualitative data in a second phase, built on the results of the quantitative analysis. 
During the first phase of research, I already conducted a negative binomial regression analysis whereby the dependent variable, regional 
proliferation, is treated as an event. Specifically, I want to estimate whether institutional quality indicators, proxied by social capital, 
democracy, and crime rates, have a significant effect on the extent of regional proliferation in Indonesia. In the analysis, I also considered 
several motives of regional proliferation such as fiscal incentive (the share of intergovernmental transfers), income (GRDP per capita), 
population, area, and ethnic fractionalization. My period of observation covers the period 2007 to 2014 in 32 provinces. 
REGIONAL PROLIFERATION POLICY IN INDONESIA 
1. As we already knew, regional proliferation is one of the policies to implement decentralization in Indonesia. How does the Provincial 
Stakeholders’ view on the Central Government’s design of the regional proliferation policy in Indonesia as a part of Indonesian fiscal 
decentralization policy? 
2. Regional proliferation in my case study is regulated comprehensively according to Government Ordinance No. 78/2007, which is derived 
from Law No. 32/2004 on Local Government. In addition, our period of observation is from 2007 to 2014, which takes place during Soesilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono’s (SBY) administration. Can you explain the difference between the regional proliferation policy of the current 
administration (Joko Widodo) and SBY’s administration? 
CLARIFICATION ON QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
1. My quantitative results show that fiscal incentive and income cannot be a motive for regions in Indonesia to proliferate, but ethnic 




District of Ciamis and District of Tangerang had been proliferated into the District of Pangandaran and the City of South Tangerang, 
respectively. As far as you know, what drives these new autonomous regions to proliferate? Do you think that such proliferation is viewed as a 
means per se to boost local economic development and public services in the new autonomous region? 
2. On institutional quality, what and how are members of the Provincial Parliament and Provincial Government involved in the decision- 
making process of granting a region to proliferate? As far as you know, is there any involvement of other actors (e.g. local elites, local 
businessmen, provincial elites, national elites, and political party) on regional proliferation in your region? If so, what is the role of those 
actors? How and why are such actors involved in the regional proliferation in your region? 
 






This interview is part of my research that investigates the determinants of regional proliferation in Indonesia. I use a sequential explanatory 
strategy, characterized by the collection and analysis of quantitative data in a first phase of research, followed by the collection and analysis of 
qualitative data in a second phase, built on the results of the quantitative analysis. 
During the first phase of research, I already conducted a negative binomial regression analysis whereby the dependent variable, regional 
proliferation, is treated as an event. Specifically, I want to estimate whether institutional quality indicators, proxied by social capital, 
democracy, and crime rates, have a significant effect on the extent of regional proliferation in Indonesia. In the analysis, I also considered 
several motives of regional proliferation such as fiscal incentive (the share of intergovernmental transfers), income (GRDP per capita), 
population, area, and ethnic fractionalization. My period of observation covers the period 2007 to 2014 in 32 provinces. 




1. As we already knew, regional proliferation is one of the policies to implement decentralization in Indonesia. How do stakeholders in Parent 
Regions view the Central Government’s design of the regional proliferation policy in Indonesia as a part of the Indonesian fiscal 
decentralization policy? 
2. Regional proliferation in my case study is regulated comprehensively according to Government Ordinance No. 78/2007, which is derived 
from Law No. 32/2004 on Local Government. In addition, our period of observation is from 2007 to 2014, which takes place during Soesilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono’s (SBY) administration. Can you explain the difference between the regional proliferation policy of the current 
administration (Joko Widodo) and that of SBY’s administration? 
CLARIFICATION ON QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
1. My quantitative results show that fiscal incentive and income cannot be a motive for regions in Indonesia to proliferate, but ethnic 
fractionalization and institutions do matter for the extent of regional proliferation in Indonesia. I knew that the District of Ciamis and the 
District of Tangerang had been proliferated into the District of Pangandaran and the City of South Tangerang, respectively. As far as you know, 
what drives these new autonomous regions to proliferate from your region? Do you think that proliferation in your region is viewed as a means 
per se to boost local economic development and public services in the new autonomous region? 
2. On institutional quality, how are members of Local Parliament and Local Government in the Parent Region involved in the decision-making 
process of granting a region to proliferate? As far as you know, is there any involvement of other actors (e.g. local elites, local businessmen, 
provincial elites, national elites, and political party) on regional proliferation in your region? If so, what is the role of those actors? How and 
why are such actors involved in the regional proliferation in your region? 
 









This interview is part of my research that investigates the determinants of regional proliferation in Indonesia. I use a sequential explanatory 
strategy, characterized by the collection and analysis of quantitative data in a first phase of research, followed by the collection and analysis of 
qualitative data in a second phase, built on the results of the quantitative analysis. 
During the first phase of research, I already conducted a negative binomial regression analysis whereby the dependent variable, regional 
proliferation, is treated as an event. Specifically, I want to estimate whether institutional quality indicators, proxied by social capital, 
democracy, and crime rates, have a significant effect on the extent of regional proliferation in Indonesia. In the analysis, I also considered 
several motives of regional proliferation such as fiscal incentive (the share of intergovernmental transfers), income (GRDP per capita), 
population, area, and ethnic fractionalization. My period of observation is from 2007 to 2014 in 32 provinces. 
REGIONAL PROLIFERATION POLICY IN INDONESIA 
1. As we already knew, regional proliferation is one of the policies to implement decentralization in Indonesia. How do stakeholders in the 
New Autonomous Regions view the Central Government’s design of the regional proliferation policy in Indonesia as a part of the Indonesian 
fiscal decentralization policy? 
2. Regional proliferation in my case study is regulated comprehensively according to Government Ordinance No. 78/2007, which is derived 
from Law No. 32/2004 on Local Government. In addition, our period of observation is from 2007 to 2014, which takes place during Soesilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono’s (SBY) administration. Can you explain the difference between the regional proliferation policy of the current 
administration (Joko Widodo) and that of SBY’s administration? 
CLARIFICATION ON QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
1. My quantitative results show that fiscal incentive and income cannot be a motive for regions in Indonesia to proliferate, but ethnic 
fractionalization and institutions do matter for the number of regional proliferation in Indonesia. I knew that District of Ciamis and District of 




District of Pangandaran and City of South Tangerang to proliferate from District of Ciamis and District of Tangerang, respectively? Do you 
think that proliferation in your region is viewed as a means per se to boost local economic development and public services? 
2. On institutional quality, how are members of Local Parliament in the Parent Region involved in the decision-making process of granting a 
region to proliferate? As far as you know, is there any involvement of other actors (e.g. local elites, local businessmen, provincial elites, 
national elites, and political party) on regional proliferation in your region? If so, what is the role of those actors? How and why are such actors 
involved in the regional proliferation in your region? 
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A3.1 List of Developing Countries in Essay II 
 
No Country Region Income Group No Country Region Income Group 
1 Afghanistan South Asia Low income 29 India South Asia Lower middle income 
2 Albania Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income 30 Indonesia East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income 
3 Algeria Middle East & North Africa Upper middle income 31 Jordan Middle East & North Africa Upper middle income 
4 Angola Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income 31 Kazakhstan Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income 
5 Argentina Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 33 Kyrgyz Republic Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income 
6 Armenia Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income 34 Lebanon Middle East & North Africa Upper middle income 
7 Bangladesh South Asia Lower middle income 35 Malaysia East Asia & Pacific Upper middle income 
8 Belarus Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income 36 Morocco Middle East & North Africa Lower middle income 
9 Bolivia Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income 37 Nigeria Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income 
10 Brazil Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 38 Pakistan South Asia Lower middle income 
11 Bulgaria Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income 39 Paraguay Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
12 Cameroon Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income 40 Peru Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
13 China East Asia & Pacific Upper middle income 41 Philippines East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income 
14 Colombia Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 42 Romania Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income 
15 Costa Rica Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 43 Senegal Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 
16 Côte d'Ivoire Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income 44 South Africa Sub-Saharan Africa Upper middle income 
17 Cuba Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 45 Sri Lanka South Asia Lower middle income 
18 Dominica Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 46 Sudan Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income 
19 Dominican Rep. Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 47 Tajikistan Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income 
20 Ecuador Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 48 Tanzania Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 
21 Egypt, Arab Rep. Middle East & North Africa Lower middle income 49 Thailand East Asia & Pacific Upper middle income 
22 El Salvador Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income 50 Tunisia Middle East & North Africa Lower middle income 
23 Ethiopia Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 51 Turkey Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income 
24 Georgia Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income 52 Turkmenistan Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income 
25 Ghana Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income 53 Ukraine Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income 
26 Guatemala Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income 54 Uzbekistan Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income 




28 Honduras Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income 56 Vietnam East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income 
 
 
Appendix A4.1 List of Developing Countries in Essay III 
 
No Country Region Income Group No Country Region Income Group 
1 Afghanistan South Asia Low income 27 Kyrgyz Republic Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income 
2 Albania Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income 28 Lebanon Middle East & North Africa Upper middle income 
3 Algeria Middle East & North Africa Upper middle income 29 Malaysia East Asia & Pacific Upper middle income 
4 Argentina Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 30 Morocco Middle East & North Africa Lower middle income 
5 Armenia Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income 31 Nigeria Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income 
6 Bangladesh South Asia Lower middle income 32 Pakistan South Asia Lower middle income 
7 Belarus Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income 33 Peru Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
8 Bolivia Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income 34 Philippines East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income 
9 Brazil Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 35 Romania Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income 
10 Bulgaria Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income 36 Senegal Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 
11 Cameroon Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income 37 Sri Lanka South Asia Lower middle income 
12 China East Asia & Pacific Upper middle income 38 Sudan Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income 
13 Colombia Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 39 Tanzania Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 
14 Costa Rica Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 40 Thailand East Asia & Pacific Upper middle income 
15 Côte d'Ivoire Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income 41 Tunisia Middle East & North Africa Lower middle income 
16 Dominica Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 42 Turkey Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income 
17 Ecuador Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 43 Ukraine Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income 
18 Egypt, Arab Rep. Middle East & North Africa Lower middle income 44 Uzbekistan Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income 
19 El Salvador Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income 45 Venezuela, RB Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income 
20 Ethiopia Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 46 Vietnam East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income 
21 Georgia Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income     
22 Ghana Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income     
23 Honduras Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income     




25 Indonesia East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income     
26 Kazakhstan Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income     
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Appendix A4.2 Summary on the Fiscal Decentralization–Growth Nexus 
 
Author (year) Sample Period Findings 
Cross-Country Analysis: Mixed Sample Countries 
Davoodi 
(1998) 
and Zou 19 developed 
countries and 27 
developing countries 
1970 – 1989 Developed countries: no 
significant relationship; 
Developing countries and 
world sample: negative 
and significant 




developed 1974 – 1991 No significant relationship 
Iimi (2005) 7 low income 
countries, 10 lower 
middle income 
countries, 12 upper 
middle income 
countries, and 22 
high income 
countries 
1997 – 2001 Positive and significant 
Cross-Country Analysis: OECD Countries 
Thiessen (2001) 22 high income 
OECD countries and 
4 advanced middle 
income countries 
1975 – 1995 Negative and significant; 
hump-shaped relationship 
Thornton (2007) 19 OECD countries 1980 – 2000 No significant relationship 
Bodman (2008) 18 OECD countries 1981 – 1998 No significant relationship 
Rodriguez-Pose and 
Ezcurra (2011) 
21 OECD countries 1990 – 2005 Negative and significant 
Baskaran 
(2013) 
and Feld 23 OECD countries 1975 – 2008 Negative and insignificant 
for GFS-style measure; 
Negative and significant 
for OECD-style measure 
Gemmell 
(2013) 
et al. 23 OECD countries 1972 – 2005 Negative and significant 
for spending indicator; 
Positive and significant 
for revenue indicator 
Filippetti and Sacchi 
(2016) 
21 OECD countries 1970 – 2010 Positive and significant 
Single Country Analysis: Developed Countries 
Xie et al. (1999) USA 1949 – 1994 Negative and significant 
Akai and Sakata 
(2002) 
USA 1988 – 1996 Positive and significant 
Stansel (2005) 314 U.S. 
metropolitan areas 
1960 – 1990 Positive and significant 
Carrion-i-Silvestre et 
al. (2008) 
Spain 1964 – 2000 Negative and significant 
Single Country Analysis: Developing Countries 
Lin and Liu (2000) China 1970 – 1993 Positive and significant 
Jin and Zou (2005) China 1979 – 1993 Positive and significant 
Faridi (2011) Pakistan 1972 – 2009 Positive and significant 
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Yushkov (2015) Russia 2005 – 2012 Negative and significant 
 
Appendix A4.3 Summary of Methodology in Literature Review 
 
Author (year) Econometric 
Technique 
Dependent Variable Fiscal Decentralization 
Indicator 
Cross-Country Analysis: Mixed Sample Countries 
Davoodi and Zou 
(1998) 
Fixed Effect Five-Year and Ten- 
Year Averages  of 
Per Capita GDP 
Growth 




Fixed Effect Annual, Three-Year 
and Five-Year 
Averages of Per 
Capita GDP Growth 
Ratio of local government 
revenue in total government 
revenue, ratio of local 
government revenue less 
grant-in-aid in total 
government revenue, ratio 
of local government 
expenditure in total 
government expenditure, 
ratio of local government 
expenditure in total 
government expenditure less 
defense and social security 
expenditure 
Iimi (2005) IV Five-Year averages 
of Per Capita GDP 
Growth 
Local share of total 
government expenditure 
Cross-Country Analysis: OECD Countries 
Thiessen (2001) OLS and pooled 
OLS 
The rate of growth  
of real GDP 
Share of sub-national 
government expenditures in 
total government 
expenditures, share of local 
government’s own source 
revenue and its change in 
total government revenue 
Thornton (2007) OLS Annual averages of 
Per Capita GDP 
Growth 
Ratio of own local 
government tax revenue and 
its square 
Bodman (2008) OLS and pooled 
OLS 
The change in the 
natural log of real 
GDP per capita 
Sub-national own tax 
revenue, sub-national own 
and shared taxes and total 
sub-national tax revenue as 
the share of general 
government (GG) tax 
revenue, and total sub- 
national expenditure and 
lending, minus loan 
repayments, as a  percentage 
of     consolidated     general 
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   government expenditure, 
without social security and 




Pooled OLS Five-Year averages 














and Fixed Effect and 
IV fixed effect 
Growth rate of real 
gross domestic 
product (GDP) per 
capita 
Sub-national tax revenues 
divided by total government 
tax revenue and sub- 
national expenditures as 




al. IV pooled OLS Growth rate of GDP Sub-national revenue and 
expenditure share in total 
government revenue and 
expenditure, ratio of own 
revenue (the ratio of sub- 
national revenue minus 
grants from other 
governments in consolidated 
general government 
revenue), autonomous own 
revenue (the ratio of own  
tax revenue plus non-tax 
and capital revenue in 
consolidated  general 
government revenue), and 
autonomous shared own 
revenue (the ratio of own  
tax revenue plus shared tax 
revenue and non-tax and 





and System GMM Log difference in 
real per capita GDP 
over five-year period 
Share of own local tax 
revenues in total general 
government tax revenues, 
share of property taxes 
collected at the local level in 
total general government tax 
revenues, share of income 
taxes collected at the local 
level in total general 
government tax revenues 
Single Country Analysis: Developed Countries 
Xie et al. (1999) OLS Per capita 
growth rate 
GDP Average tax rate and shares 
in government spending at 
different levels 
Akai and Sakata OLS Average annual Ratio of local government 
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(2002)  growth rate of per 
capita gross state 
product 
revenue to combined state 
and local government 
revenue, ratio of local 
government expenditure in 
combined state and local 
government expenditure, 
local government’s own 
revenue share in its total 
government revenue, and 
mean of all revenue and 
expenditure indicators 
mentioned above 
Stansel (2005) OLS Growth in log of 
population and 
growth in log of real 
per capita money 
income 
Number of general-purpose 
governments (county and 
sub-county) per 100,000 
residents and number of 









Pooled OLS, IV 
Pooled OLS, 
GMM 
Annual variation in 
logarithm of either 
gross domestic 
product (GDP) per 
capita or gross value 
added (GVA) per 
capita 
Share of local government 
revenue in the sum of total 
government revenues, share 
of local government 
expenditures in the sum of 
total government 
expenditures,  net 
intergovernmental transfers, 
share of local health 
investment in the sum of 
total government health 
investments 
Single Country Analysis: Developing Countries 
Lin and 
(2000) 
 Liu Fixed Effect Growth rate of real 
per capita GDP 
Marginal retention rate 
(changes in the rate at which 
revenue increments are 
retained by provincial 
governments) of locally 
collected budgetary revenue 
and average retention rate of 




 Zou Fixed Effect Real 
rate 
GDP growth Share of local government 
revenue in the sum of total 
government revenues, share 
of local government 








   and revenue in total 
government expenditure and 
revenue 
Yushkov (2015) Fixed effect Growth rate of Gross 
Regional Product 
(GRP) 
Ratio of sub–national 
government expenditures 
and revenue in total 
government expenditure and 
revenue, share of total 
intergovernmental transfer 
in total revenue, share of 
own tax revenue in total 
revenue 
 
Appendix A4.4 Summary of Control Variables in Literature Review 
 
Author (year) Control Variables 
Cross-Country Analysis: Mixed Sample Countries 
Davoodi and Zou (1998) Average growth rate of population, initial level of 
human capital, initial per capita GDP, average real 
investment share of GDP, and average tax share of 
GDP 
Woller and Phillips (1998) Trade openness, sum of total foreign bank assets and 
liabilities divided by GDP, inflation rate based on 
GDP deflator, variance of inflation, index of political 
repression, index of civil liberty, value of real 
exchange rate, log difference of domestic credit 
Iimi (2005) Average growth rate of population, initial level of 
human capital, initial GDP, average real investment 
share of GDP, political freedom, dummy for income 
countries group and average tax share of GDP 
Cross-Country Analysis: OECD Countries 
Thiessen (2001) Annual change of unemployment rate, annual fiscal 
balance as share of GDP, annual inflation rate, 
growth rate of gross fixed capital formation deflated 
by producer price index, annual rate of labor force 
growth, annual rate of population growth, average 
annual gross investment share of GDP, annual 
secondary school enrolment ratio, annual total factor 
productivity, and several dummy variables 
Thornton (2007) Average investment rate, initial level of human 
capital, initial level of per capita GDP, dummy 
variable for unitary government structures, and 
average population growth rate 
Bodman (2008) Average years of schooling, general government final 
consumption expenditure as percentage of GDP, 
vertical fiscal imbalance, standard deviation of 
domestic credit growth, and measure of political 
freedom 
Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2011) Initial GDP per capita, level of physical and human 
capital, measured respectively as net capital stock per 
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 unit of GDP and average years of schooling of total 
population aged 15 years and over, average 
population growth rate, degree of trade openness, 
share of total public expenditure in national GDP 
Baskaran and Feld (2013) Lag of GDP per capita, investment share of GDP, 
percentage of secondary school enrollment, 
population growth rate, tax to GDP ratio, inflation 
rate, trade openness, annual labor productivity 
growth rate, dummy for country 
Gemmell et al. (2013) Investment rate, employment growth, and ratio of 
general government revenue to GDP 
Filippetti and Sacchi (2016) Population growth, urbanization, unemployment rate, 
log of the tertiary school enrolment rate, degree of 
openness, gross fixed capital formation growth, 
logarithm of real per capita GDP at the beginning of 
that period, national political party in office, 
circumstance of being a federal country, type of local 
government election, public sector’s fragmentation to 
control for number of participating sub-national 
governments, degree of regional authority 
Single Country Analysis: Developed Countries 
Xie et al. (1999) Size of labour force, investment rate, measure of 
external shock (price index of energy products), two 
measures of openness of economy (ratio of foreign 
trade volume over GDP and average tariff rate), 
inflation rate, gini coefficient 
Akai and Sakata (2002) Percentage of high school graduates in total 
population aged 18–24 years in 1992, average annual 
growth rate of state population, share of seats in state 
legislature held by Democrats in 1992, gini 
coefficient, state’s share of total US patents issued in 
1992, trade openness, dummy for state’s location in 
the southern region 
Stansel (2005) 1950–1960 growth in log of population, log of 1960 
population, 1959 real per capita money income, 1960 
unemployment rate, 1960 manufacturing sector share 
of total employment, 1960 percentage of population 
(age 25 and older) with 16 or more years of school, 
forty-eight state dummy variables 
Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2008) Annual change in natural logarithm of labor force, 
change in natural logarithm of human capita, change 
in natural logarithm of private and public capital 
stock 
Single Country Analysis: Developing Countries 
Lin and Liu (2000) Percentage of production teams in rural areas that 
adopted HRS, moving average of real per capita GDP 
in preceding 3 years, percentage of rural population, 
total population, ratio of state’s real procurement 
price index for farm products to real price index of 
manufacture goods in rural area, Share of Non-SOEs’ 
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 output in total industrial output, growth rate of per 
capita fixed asset investment 
Jin and Zou (2005) Investment rate, labor force growth rate, level of 
openness and lagged rate of provincial inflation 
Faridi (2011) Trade openness, annual inflation rate, literacy rate, 
total fixed investment, one-lagged period of GDP 
Yushkov (2015) Trade openness, population growth rate, investment 
rate, natural logarithm of three-year lagged values of 
GRP, inflation based on CPI, share of total natural 
resource production, proxy of human capital 
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A5.1 List of Developing Countries in Essay IV 
 
No Country Region Income Group No Country Region Income Group 
1 Afghanistan South Asia Low income 29 India South Asia Lower middle income 
2 Albania Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income 30 Indonesia East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income 
3 Algeria Middle East & North Africa Upper middle income 31 Jordan Middle East & North Africa Upper middle income 
4 Angola Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income 31 Kazakhstan Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income 
5 Argentina Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 33 Kyrgyz Republic Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income 
6 Armenia Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income 34 Lebanon Middle East & North Africa Upper middle income 
7 Bangladesh South Asia Lower middle income 35 Malaysia East Asia & Pacific Upper middle income 
8 Belarus Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income 36 Morocco Middle East & North Africa Lower middle income 
9 Bolivia Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income 37 Nigeria Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income 
10 Brazil Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 38 Pakistan South Asia Lower middle income 
11 Bulgaria Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income 39 Paraguay Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
12 Cameroon Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income 40 Peru Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
13 China East Asia & Pacific Upper middle income 41 Philippines East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income 
14 Colombia Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 42 Romania Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income 
15 Costa Rica Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 43 Senegal Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 
16 Côte d'Ivoire Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income 44 South Africa Sub-Saharan Africa Upper middle income 
17 Cuba Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 45 Sri Lanka South Asia Lower middle income 
18 Dominica Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 46 Sudan Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income 
19 Dominican Rep. Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 47 Tajikistan Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income 
20 Ecuador Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 48 Tanzania Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 
21 Egypt, Arab Rep. Middle East & North Africa Lower middle income 49 Thailand East Asia & Pacific Upper middle income 
22 El Salvador Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income 50 Tunisia Middle East & North Africa Lower middle income 
23 Ethiopia Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 51 Turkey Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income 
24 Georgia Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income 52 Turkmenistan Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income 
25 Ghana Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income 53 Ukraine Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income 
26 Guatemala Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income 54 Uzbekistan Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income 




28 Honduras Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income 56 Vietnam East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income 
 





Dep. Variable: Share of excluded population to powerful ethno-politically group (log) 
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Observation 86 86 44 87 87 45 87 87 45 79 79 41 79 79 41 79 79 41 




Dep. Variable: Share of excluded population to powerful ethno-politically group (log) 
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B. Variable of Interest: Expenditure Share, Institution, and Military Spending 
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Observation 86 86 44 87 87 45 87 87 45 79 79 41 79 79 41 79 79 41 




Dep. Variable: Share of excluded population to powerful ethno-politically group (log) 
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Observation 107 107 81 107 107 81 107 107 81 56 56 31 107 107 81 107 107 81 




Dep. Variable: Share of excluded population to powerful ethno-politically group (log) 
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Observation 116 116 90 116 116 90 116 116 90 110 110 86 110 110 86 110 110 86 
Groups 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Notes: The GMM models pass autocorrelation and validity tests. Number of parentheses are robust standard error. Asterisk as follows: *** = significant at 1 percent level; ** = significant at 5 percent level; * = 
significant at 10 percent level. Other explanatory variables in each equation as follows: (1) Natural logarithm of GDP per capita; (2) Population growth rate; (3) Openness in Trade. In case of GMM, first lag of 
dependent variable is an explanatory variable. Full results available upon request. 
 





Dep. Variable: Percentage of discriminated in population 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
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 (0.07) (0.06) (0.19) (0.10) (0.10) (0.35) (0.10) (0.09) (0.24) (0.14) (0.17) (0.22) (0.17) (0.20) (0.33) (0.15) (0.13) (0.16) 
Observation 42 42 24 42 42 24 42 42 24 40 40 23 40 40 23 40 40 23 




Dep. Variable: Percentage of discriminated in population 
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Observation 42 42 24 42 42 24 42 42 24 40 40 23 40 40 23 40 40 23 




Dep. Variable: Percentage of discriminated in population 
(37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) (51) (52) (53) (54) 
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Observation 34 34 22 34 34 22 34 34 22 18 18 10 29 29 19 29 29 19 




Dep. Variable: Percentage of discriminated in population 
(55) (56) (57) (58) (59) (60) (61) (62) (63) (64) (65) (66) (67) (68) (69) (70) (71) (72) 
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Observation 34 34 22 34 34 22 34 34 22 29 29 19 29 29 19 29 29 19 
Groups 12 12 9 12 12 9 12 12 9 10 10 7 10 10 7 10 10 7 
Notes: The GMM models pass autocorrelation and validity tests. Number of parentheses are robust standard error. Asterisk as follows: *** = significant at 1 percent level; ** = significant at 5 percent level; * = 
significant at 10 percent level. Other explanatory variables as follows: (1) Natural logarithm of GDP per capita; (2) Population growth rate; (3) Openness in Trade. In case of GMM, first lag of dependent variable 
included as explanatory variable. Full results available upon request. 
 
 





Dep. Variable: Percentage of powerless in population 
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Observation 125 125 73 126 126 74 126 126 74 109 109 65 109 109 65 109 109 65 




Dep. Variable: Percentage of powerless in population 
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Observation 125 125 73 126 126 74 126 126 74 109 109 65 109 109 65 109 109 65 







Dep. Variable: Percentage of powerless in population 
(37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) (51) (52) (53) (54) 
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Observation 115 115 89 115 115 89 115 115 89 59 59 36 110 110 86 110 110 86 




Dep. Variable: Percentage of powerless in population 
(55) (56) (57) (58) (59) (60) (61) (62) (63) (64) (65) (66) (67) (68) (69) (70) (71) (72) 
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       (13.46) (15.33) (22.44)          
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Observation 116 116 90 116 116 90 116 116 90 110 110 86 110 110 86 110 110 86 
Groups 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Notes: The GMM models pass autocorrelation and validity tests. Number of parentheses are robust standard error. Asterisk as follows: *** = significant at 1 percent level; ** = significant at 5 percent level; * = 
significant at 10 percent level. Other explanatory variables as follows: (1) Natural logarithm of GDP per capita; (2) Population growth rate; (3) Openness in Trade. In case of GMM, first lag of dependent variable 
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